Medical Devices: Law, Trends and Oddities

Texas preemption and fraud decision in medical device case

In a Texas federal district court, summary judgment has been granted to defendants in a Class III medical device case on preemption grounds.  The devices at issue were hip implant components and bone cement used in the procedure.  Scott v. Pfizer, Inc., Slip Copy, 2008 WL 508641 (E.D.Tex.). 

One defendant sought to dismiss malice/fraud and misrepresentation allegations on the ground that they were not specifically pleaded.  The court dismissed those allegations because they did not meet a "who, what, when and where" pleading specificity standard.  The manufacturer of the implant has also moved for summary judgment on the other claims of the plaintiff, but that motion has not yet been decided.

The other defendant who manufactured the bone cement moved for summary judgment on preemption grounds.  The bone cement was a device that was grandfathered in as a Class III device with the inception of the Medical Device Act in 1976.  There was a recent Louisiana case that granted preemption for a product in a similar posture that I discussed in a earlier post (read here).  The Texas court agreed that preemption should apply to this device.  This decision was made before the Supreme Court ruled in the Reigel case a couple of weeks ago.

Plaintiff also claimed that there was a violation in the manufacturing processes of the defendant and sought to raise a question of fact as to the claim of a manufacturing defect.  The defendant offered proof that the product was manufactured properly, and that it met the manufacturing specifications.  In the absence of contrary proof, the court held that summary judgment should be granted because plaintiff could not show that there was in fact a manufacturing defect. 

Knee implant medical device case dismissed

The Sixth Circuit dismissed a product liability design defect and failure to warn case brought against Zimmer which had manufactured a knee replacement system. 

In Yanovich v. Zimmer Austin, Inc.,  2007 WL 4163860, plaintiff (the person suing) produced a single expert, whose field of expertise was in polymer engineering.  This expert was not a medical doctor, and did not offer any opinions as to whether the claimed defect was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

Typically, to be able to prevail, a plaintiff must prove a defect under the law, and must prove that the defect actually caused the injuries alleged.  This is basic fairness and common sense.

Zimmer moved for summary judgment, basically arguing that they felt that there were no issues for a jury to decide.  Zimmer argued that there was no proof that the product was defective, and that there was no proof that the alleged defect actually caused injury.  Plaintiff opposed the motion, and raised new claims that Zimmer claimed were not a part of the expert's opinions offered during discovery.

The appeals court considered the additional evidence offered by the plaintiff even though the court below did not. 

No manufacturing defect

In considering that evidence, the court felt that there was a fact question as to whether there was a difference between the product's specifications and a portion of the knee replacement system removed from the plaintiff.  However, this was insufficient to allow a jury to consider the plaintiff's lawsuit.

The court felt that the inquiry needed to go further and reviewed the question of whether the difference was 'material'.  In reviewing materiality, the court found it significant that the expert did not test whether the difference in hardness (the specification discrepancy at issue) would result in a difference in failure of the implant.  The court also observed that the expert did not rule out other possible causes of the failure (a necessary step in order to allow circumstantial evidence to prove a defect).

Therefore, the court felt that there was nothing for a jury to need to decide as to a manufacturing defect claim.

No design defect

The court also rejected design defect claims because the expert failed to research or make an analysis of the foreseeable risks versus benefits of the design at issue.

No warnings defect

Applying the 'learned intermediary doctrine' the court held that there was no failure to warn because the warnings provided to physicians was adequate.  The rule for drugs and medical devices in all states, except for a recent aberrant decision in West Virginia, is that the manufacturer has a duty to warn the physician, and not the patient, because in the case of drugs, the physician is making the prescription, and in the case of devices, is using the device. 

Discussion

I use this case a baseline for a discussion of other similar cases in the future.  Essential to the proof of claims against device companies is proof of a defect (was it manufactured properly?  Was it designed properly?).  It is also essential that it be proved that the defect caused injury.  The appellate court here did not have to decide whether plaintiff raised a question of fact as to that issue because it determined that there was no product defect.  Warnings must adequately advise the physician of the risks and the use of the product.   Finally, it is essential that the opinions offered by 'experts' be grounded in sound science, and in the facts and circumstance of an individual case.  The court in this case felt that this was not the case with the plaintiff's expert's opinions.  The need for scientific rigor is based on fundamental fairness.